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Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional  
Decay in Kenya* 
 
By Susanne D. Mueller 
 
“They must be taught to accept defeat and look forward to other good things 
for if no one was a loser then what would happen?”1 
Introduction 
This paper examines the lessons learned from Kenya’s 2007 post election violence and what 
has happened since then. It notes that the root causes of the violence still persist, have not 
been addressed, and easily could be reignited. Faced with a situation where institutions and 
the rule of law have been weakened deliberately and where diffused violence is widespread, 
both Kenya’s transition to democracy and the fate of the nation remain vulnerable. The 
argument here is that the problems faced in holding and managing elections in conflict 
situations often are not simply technical. Instead, in Kenya and elsewhere, many difficulties 
are symptomatic of larger political and institutional questions related to democratic change 
that are more difficult to analyze in causal terms or to address. 
Democratic theorists from Robert Dahl2 onward have long understood that 
democracy consists of much more than just multi-party elections. At the heart of the 
democratic experiment are two underlying caveats bordering on truisms. First, there must be 
a willingness to lose elections and not to win them by any means and at all costs, including 
killing one’s opponents. In established democracies, both politicians and the public accept 
that tomorrow is another day to get their person elected. Second, and central to democracy 
and the democratic process, is a belief in the integrity of the rule of law and institutions that 
must be matched by the way in which laws and institutions operate in practice. Where this 
does not occur, democracy is vulnerable. However, there is little by way of agreement about 
the underlying causes or events that give rise to these two factors or trigger the incentives for 
elite consensus necessary for their emergence. 
                                                
* This is a revised version of paper prepared for a “Workshop on Elections and Conflict: Promoting Good 
Practice in Electoral Conflict Management,” The North South Institute, Ottawa, Canada, 29–30 October 2009. 
Thanks to Phil Keefer, Ron Rogowski, Steve Levitsky, Charles Hornsby, and Stephen Brown for their 
comments and editorial suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1 Kimani Njogu, Healing the Wound:Personal Narratives About The 2007 Post-Election Violence in 
Kenya  (Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 2009), 288-89. 
2 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). 
Also see footnote 3.  
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Clearly, the acceptance of loss and institutions bound by the rule of law do not 
emerge as a result of altruism, but are instead the product of other factors.3 Nevertheless, in 
these situations, a vicious circle ensues. As Acemoglu and Robinson note, where political 
elites are not constrained by checks and balances and are not forced to be accountable,4 they 
will use their de facto power to undermine de jure changes and “avoid democratic institutions 
which are more costly for them” in terms of power and rents.5 One such cost is an 
undesirable shorter time in office. To avoid this outcome, Collier and Hoefler find that 
incumbents in new democracies more than doubled their time in office, from 6.4 to 15.8 
years, by using “dirty [electoral] tactics” such as rigging.6 This suggests that politicians have 
powerful incentives to subvert laws and institutions that keep them from gaining or retaining 
power. Politicians don’t want to lose and will do whatever is necessary to stay in power. 
When they are successful, this creates dangerous incentives and possibilities for even further 
deinstitutionalization and even greater dissipation of the rule of law. A vicious circle then 
ensues with institutional decay and lawlessness begetting more of the same as well as 
inviting further recourse to violence once institutional constraints are removed.  
Boone’s research finds that the less constrained elites are in terms of laws and 
institutions, the greater the likelihood is that they also will resort to other means to gain or 
retain power, including using violence. In her discussion of electoral populism in the Cote 
d’Ivoire, Boone shows how land was expropriated and rules concerning citizenship were 
changed as both were mobilized as forms of electoral patronage. This meant that existing 
institutions, laws, and rules were all up for grabs with the introduction of multi-partyism. The 
only thing that mattered was “who was in control of the central government,” not what was 
on the books. In short, once sacrosanct rights concerning land and citizenship suddenly 
became malleable, nothing was “fixed or “neutral.” This paved the way for the possibility of 
expropriation, violence, and “politics in which losers h[ad] few incentives to abide by 
outcomes generated through elections.”7  
In places such as Kenya, institutional checks and balances and rules concerning 
accountability may exist on paper. Often, however, they are overridden personally by 
                                                
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss fully theories concerning democracy and the transition to 
democracy. 
4 Daron Acemoglu, Pablo Queribin, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “When Does Policy Reform 
Work: The Case of Central Bank Independence,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity–2008, 1, (Spring 
2008), 353–54. 
5 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “Persistence of Power Elites and Institutions,” American 
Economic Review 98, 1 (2008), 288–89. 
6 Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, ”Democracy’s Achilles’ Heel or How to Win an Election without Really 
Trying,” CSAE Working Paper WPS/2009–08, Center for the Study of African Economics, Department of 
Economics, Oxford University, July 2009, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/politicaleconomy.htm (last 
accessed 13 July 2009). 
7 Catherine Boone, “Electoral Populism Where Property Rights Are Weak: Land Politics in Contemporary 
Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative Politics, 41, 2 (January 2009), 196, 184, 183. 
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politicians, civil servants, and others operating under an entirely different set of incentives, 
sanctions, and enforcement mechanisms. Public trust in institutions and the rule of law then 
dissipates. This increases the propensity for electoral and other contests to be resolved in the 
streets through violence rather than around tables or in courts. This may induce a vicious 
circle-like syndrome with violence rather than the law or institutions becoming the likely 
arbiter. Violence undermines democracy. Furthermore, in circumstances where violence is a 
cost effective way of competing for power and there is no consequence for using it, it is 
difficult both to ensure non-violent political competition or for it to be about much more than 
“who will protect me from harm from the other side.” Also, violence tends then to beget 
more violence. Politicians are dying to win and freed of institutional and legal constraints are 
able and willing to use violence to achieve their ends. 
In these circumstances, there is every reason for both local and international 
organizations to try to improve institutions involved in the electoral process. However, in the 
absence of incentives to adhere to the rule of law and a well founded practical belief in the 
integrity and legitimacy of institutions, institutional reforms may be bypassed, undermined, 
and not accepted by the political elite or the public. In these circumstances, particularly 
where violence previously has been used as an arbiter and where the incentives of the 
political class have not changed, more violence and a further breakdown of order is 
increasingly likely.  
In Kenya, many local and external organizations have been engaged in attempts to 
improve the electoral process. For the most part, existing efforts to consolidate democracy 
have focused on changing formal laws and institutions without considering the incentives and 
enforcement mechanisms that support them. This has involved a variety of technical 
initiatives: trying to institutionalize a more equitable playing field surrounding the conduct of 
elections; improving the nomination process and how political parties function before, 
during, and after elections; creating a better, improved, and more independent electoral 
commission, electoral rolls, vote tallying and monitoring procedures; and addressing other 
issues that surround the electoral process, including constituency delimitation and access to 
the media. However, these efforts are not self-enforcing as they do not necessarily affect the 
incentives or ability of actors to resort to extra-institutional and violent modes of behavior. 
Hence, the question arises whether given the intensified political and ethnic divisions and the 
continued diffusion of violence in Kenya since the 2007 election, the consensus exists to 
improve institutions in these areas and even if they are changed on paper, whether these 
improvements will be subverted or undermined in practice? In short, formal institutional 
changes may not inhibit more rounds of violence in the future. An election might or might 
not be the precipitating factor. Also, as the diffusion of various types of violence proliferates, 
the catalyst next time also could be something else entirely. 
These issues and observations feed into broader questions that have been raised but 
have been far from answered fully by political scientists, policy makers, and practitioners: 
whether observers were too quick to put the democratic label on what are mostly “virtual 
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democracies” or exercises in “competitive authoritarianism”8; whether certain underlying 
structural conditions (e.g., levels of economic development, institutionalization of the rule of 
law, sequencing etc.) are essential prerequisites for genuine multiparty democracy9; whether 
as others argue, the evidence supports the view that engaging in multiparty democracy is in 
itself a positive practice that facilitates democratic behavior; or whether even if this is 
minimally true, the effects of electoral participation still may be heavily diluted by some of 
the broader political economy factors discussed above.10  
While discussing these issues fully in the context of Kenya is outside the scope of this 
paper, much of what has happened there raises similar questions. Kenya’s rising and 
entrepreneurial middle class and the belief that it would embrace the rule of law and strong 
institutions to protect its interests intellectually underlay the positive but incorrect spin on 
Kenya’s transition to democracy.11 Many thought that with its peaceful 2002 election, Kenya 
had made it, ignoring the fact that the main contestants for president were two members of 
the same ethnic group, but that many underlying generic factors had not changed. The results 
of the 2002 presidential election, in turn, seemed to buttress the notion of voluntarism: the 
idea that elections themselves were good practice and promoted democracy. In fact, as 
elections in Kenya and the theorizing about them continued, so did the proliferation of non-
state violence, the emergence of possible “shadow states”12, the personalization of power, a 
zero-sum view of winning infused by ethnicity, and the persistence of unreformed 
institutions. This was coupled with the hollowing out of institutions, and a hardening of the 
notion of winning at all costs, with ethnic polarization increasing and the nation becoming 
more violent and fragile. 
                                                
8 See Richard Joseph, “Africa 1990–1997: From Abertura to Closure,” Journal of Democracy 9, 2 (1998), 
1–17; Thomas Carothers, “Democracy without Illusions,” Foreign Affairs 76 (November–December 1997), 22–
48; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy 13, 2 
(April 2002), 51–65. 
9 See Francis Fukuyama, Thomas Carothers, Edward Mansfield, and Jack Snyder, and Sheri Berman, 
“The Debate on ‘Sequencing,” Journal of Democracy 18, 3 (July 2007), 5–22; Daniel Branch and Nic 
Cheeseman, “Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Kenya: Lessons From Kenya,” African Affairs 
108, 430 (January 2009), 1–26. 
10 Steffan Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2006). Posner also argues that there has been progress in Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, “The 
Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa,” Journal of Democracy 18, 3 (July 2007), 126–40. 
11 As John Githongo has noted, “Indeed, in a cruel irony the much vaunted middle class, supposed to be 
the driver of modernity, became and remains the most vociferous of Kenya’s new ethnic nationalists.” See 
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/multimedia/?StoryID=269341 (last accessed on 10 October 2009). 
12 William Reno’s work is most closely associated with the term “shadow states”. He defines a shadow 
state  “as one that is constructed behind the face of laws and government institutions” and “is a form of personal 
rule” “based on the decisions and interests of an individual, not a set of written laws and procedures”. See 
William Reno, “Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa,” Journal of International Affairs 53, 2 
(Spring 2000), 434.  
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This discussion indirectly grapples with some of the above issues. It is divided into 
three parts. The first part discusses the roots of Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence, drawing 
on a previous article.13 The second part examines these same factors one by one. It argues 
that they still are very much in place and if anything have magnified in their intensity. This 
increases the likelihood of more and possibly greater violence in the future, something 
reinforced by the failure of the political class to deal with impunity and to establish a Special 
Tribunal recommended by the Waki Commission of Inquiry to Investigate the Post Election 
Violence (CIPEV).14 The third part of the paper outlines the challenges of peacefully 
managing political and electoral conflict in situations like Kenya and suggests possible 
approaches for the future. Principal among them is the necessity to understand that given the 
persistence of existing incentives and enforcement mechanisms, formal changes to improve 
democracy by strengthening electoral institutions and practices continue to run the risk of 
being undermined in practice. 
The Roots of Violence and Conflict in Kenya’s 2007 Election Crisis 
In an earlier article15 I discussed three underlying factors that predisposed Kenya to violence 
and were ignited by a too close to call contested election. I am reiterating them here. The 
reason is that they still shape Kenya’s landscape and still predispose it to more violence, 
whether electoral or non-electoral, something to be discussed in the next section.  
The three factors at the root of the 2007 implosion were: a gradual decline in the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate force and a consequent generalized level of violence not 
always within its control; deliberately weak institutions, mostly overridden by a highly 
personalized and centralized presidency, that could and did not exercise the autonomy or 
checks and balances normally associated with democracies; and political parties that were not 
programmatic, were driven by ethnic clientism, and had a winner-take-all view of political 
power and its associated economic rewards. The central point here is that: violence was 
diffused, could be ignited easily, but not controlled, and was not; that institutions outside the 
presidency normally associated with vetting a contested election were not viewed as being 
sufficiently neutral to do so and did not; and that the nature of Kenya party politics 
predisposed both leaders and followers to see politics as a do or die zero sum game, which is 
what the 2007 election became. Had the election not been so close, these same factors may 
have been held in check for a while. Nevertheless, they were and are dangerous and looming 
problems that put Kenya on a precipice and led to it descending into a spiral of death and 
destruction along ethnic lines, thereby fracturing the already fragile idea of state and nation. 
                                                
13 S.D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 2 (July 
2008), 185–210. 
14 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV), 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, October 2008). 
15 Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis.” The first part of this paper, encompassing the 
three subsections, summarizes the main points of the article. The original article includes more theory, analysis, 
and attention to empirical detail. In some places I have used direct quotes from the paper, but being the author, I 
have not used quotation marks. 




In the case of diffused violence, gang violence, increasingly out of the state’s control, had 
become a larger and larger feature of Kenya’s landscape starting with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the decision to allow multiparty elections in 1991. Responding to 
international financial and local pressure, former President Daniel arap Moi agreed to accept 
multiparty elections in Kenya, by rescinding the controversial 2(a) clause of the constitution 
that had institutionalized a one party state. However, in practice, he detested the idea of 
multiparty democracy and was prepared to win at all costs, including using violence. Moi and 
his supporters used so called “Kalenjin warriors” in the Rift Valley and elsewhere to kill and 
displace opposition voters from other ethnic groups, most of whom were Kikuyu, Luo, and 
Luhya, while civil servants working for the state turned a blind eye or aided and abetted this 
process. This happened before and during the 1992 and 1997 elections. This violence and 
these militias spawned other gangs and other militias, including the now famous Mungiki, 
Sungu Sungu, the Sabaot Land Defense Force (SDLF), and a host of still others with 
menacing names commensurate with their activities including the Taliban, the Bagdad Boys, 
and others. Moi’s decision to engage extra state militia and to engage in what Katumanga has 
aptly called the “privatization of public violence”16 had short and long-term consequences. 
In the short run, Moi won both the 1992 and 1997 elections by undermining any 
notion of free and fair elections. The gangs used on his behalf killed and displaced his 
opponents who themselves were divided. Before and during elections in the 1990s, 
politicians hired gangs: some to intimidate members of anti-government parties, others to 
protect themselves against pro-government gangs, and still others to do whatever was 
necessary to win at any cost. 
Over the longer run, whether between the two elections in the 1990s or before, 
during, and after the 2002 and 2007 elections, these extra state militias and gangs took on a 
life of their own in many parts of the country. Gangs moved into the slums of Nairobi, the 
rural areas of Central Province, and into other parts of the country. Gangs such as Mungiki 
and others acted as well organized shakedown gangs, offering various types of “you can’t say 
no” protection and services for fees. They moved into areas neglected by government or 
where officials and police turned a blind eye in exchange for kickbacks for themselves. 
During this process, extra state violence became institutionalized with gangs like Mungiki 
infiltrating many businesses much like the Mafia. In addition, the state increasingly began to 
lose its “monopoly of legitimate force,”17 with gangs increasingly taking over much of the 
geographic space and functions of government. Hence, what began as an electoral exercise to 
                                                
16 Musumbayi Katumanga, “A City under Siege: Banditry and Modes of Accumulation in Nairobi, 1991–
2004,” Review of African Political Economy, 32, 106, December 2005, 513.  
17 Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology (New York: Kensington Publication Corporation, 2002), 
119–23. For a further discussion of this in the Kenyan context, see Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s 
Crisis.” For a discussion of the emergence of “shadow states” elsewhere in Africa, see William Reno, “The 
Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States,” Development and Change 33, 5 (2002), 837–58, and “Clandestine 
Economies, Violence, and States in Africa,” Journal of International Affairs 53, 2 (Spring 2000), 432–59. 
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win the presidency and the majority in parliament at all cost, gradually dissipated 
government control over its territory threatening the integrity of state and nation. This meant 
that by the time of the 2007 election, diffused gang violence was lying in wait and could be 
tapped, which is exactly what happened. One of the legacies of all these years was that using 
violence to win was acceptable, including in the case of a disputed election. 
Deliberately Weak Institutions 
A second factor predisposing Kenya to violence following the 2007 election was that 
institutions outside the presidency had been deliberately weakened over time through a series 
of constitutional amendments under both President Kenyatta and President Moi. They 
increased the power of the presidency and reduced that of other arms of government, 
including the judiciary, parliament, and various parts of the civil service. Furthermore, many 
of the checks and balances normally characteristic of democracies were abandoned both 
formally and informally. Civil servants and various arms of government understood how 
their bread was buttered and tended to defer to the president. Political and economic statism 
ensured that opposition was costly and would be punished.18 This weakening of autonomous 
institutions paved the way for gross repression and torture under Moi and the pervassive 
corruption of the 1980s and 1990s. The latter included setting up nominally private banks 
that were no more than officially sanctioned money laundering operations and paving the 
way for huge scandals under President Moi, such as the notorious Goldenberg and Anglo 
Leasing Scandals (with the latter continuing under President Kibaki), as well as many 
dubious land grabbing exercises. During all these periods, the courts were seen as partisan 
and under the thumb of the executive: no one was ever prosecuted for torture, for the 
electoral violence of the 1990s,19 or for corruption. Over time the state outside the president 
developed the seemingly contradictory characteristics of being deliberately weak and 
simultaneously predatory. While state predation lessened after the 2002 election of President 
Kibaki, it reemerged after 2005, albeit initially in a more attenuated form.20 This further 
decreased the legitimacy of state institutions. 
Before the 2007 election, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) also was 
deliberately weakened. In 2007, President Kibaki bypassed an agreement to consult with the 
opposition before appointing new commissioners to the ECK and replaced them all before 
the election, including making his former lawyer the Vice-Chair of the Commission. He also 
created a number of new judicial vacancies, including appeals judges before the election. 
                                                
18 For a discussion of how repression in Kenya worked and its continuity with the colonial state, see 
Susanne D. Mueller, “Government and Opposition in Kenya,” Journal of Modern African Studies 22, 3 
(September 1984), 399–427. The biggest crackdown was after the 1982 failed attempted coup. 
19 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire Into Tribal Clashes in 
Kenya (Akiwumi Report) (Nairobi: Government Printer, 31 July 1999).  
20 See Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis”; Branch and Cheeseman, “Democratization, 
Sequencing and State Failure in Kenya”; and Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late 
Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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Because of the above practices, institutions that already had been seriously weakened 
totally lost their autonomy, independence, integrity, and legitimacy over time. Furthermore, 
even as late as 2007 there was no agreed upon independent institutional arbiter to deal with 
allegations of rigging and that the election had been stolen. Hence, the dispute over the 
election took to the streets, even though much of the violence appears to have been organized 
in anticipation of possible loss.  
In short, the combination of diffused violence that could be tapped, the willingness to 
win at all costs, and the graduation dissipation of the rule of law and strong institutions, all 
predisposed Kenya to implode. 
Non-Programmatic Clientist Political Parties and Zero Sum Ethnic Politics 
Kenyan political parties are barely distinguishable in terms of ideology, programs, platforms, 
or organization. Many are no more than changing sets of ethnic coalitions. Even today’s main 
leaders, including President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga, have moved 
opportunistically from one party to another as necessity has dictated.  
Politics is viewed primarily as a winner-takes-all zero-sum ethnic game. The national 
economic cake is the prize. Various ethnic groups argue that it is their turn to eat. The means 
to this end is controlling the state and having a fellow co-ethnic become president. As parties 
are not programmatic and institutions are weak, politicians are seen primarily as personal 
distributors of private rather than public goods. Even though alliances and cross-ethnic 
coalitions are necessary to win the presidency, the winner is seen by others as the chief ethnic 
in charge. Herein lies the importance of winning and not losing, particularly as political 
losses have meant being excluded from access to state resources.  
Given the non-programmatic nature of Kenyan political parties, the lack of 
institutional checks on the president, his consequent personal power, and the expectations of 
benefits from clients, ethnicity is seen as critical in determining the distribution of national 
resources. In part, this explains the length to which leaders and followers are willing to go to 
get their person in power and the means they are willing to use to achieve their ends. Hence, 
politically inspired violence has accompanied successive multiparty elections from 1992 until 
2007. 
Even though many co-ethnics do not appear to gain materially from one of their own 
being in power, voting in Kenya generally falls along ethnic lines. One reason for this is what 
one might call the fear factor, or what I have called elsewhere “exclusionary ethnicity.” In 
short, voters sometimes vote defensively against non- co-ethnics or coalitions of non-co-
ethnics as the least bad alternative. Following the electoral violence since the 1990s when 
politically organized gangs killed, maimed, or destroyed the property of specific ethnic 
groups supporting the opposition, this fear increased along with defensive voting. While 
individual voters might like to gain materially as a client voter of a co-ethnic even if that is 
not possible, they also vote out of fear that worse things might happen to them if a non-co-
ethnic comes to power. This fear is enhanced because of the potential of the state to be 
arbitrary, predatory, and unpredictable, with laws being adjusted or bypassed to suit those 
who are in power. 
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President Kibaki’s abnegation of his 2002 election promise to make Raila Odinga his 
Prime Minister, and the 2005 watering down of a referendum to do so increased distrust 
between the Kikuyu and the Luo and other marginalized groups. The nature of non-
programmatic winner-take-all clientist political parties fed into the polarization of ethnicity 
for political ends, which could be violently ignited after the contested 2007 election and was. 
Underlying this was a deep, long seeded distrust about what would happen if another ethnic 
group or coalition of ethnic groups took over, as well as a willingness by the political elite 
and its opponents to win at all costs to hold on to or to obtain political power and all the 
material rewards that come with it.  
Because of the factors just discussed above, two tenets fundamental to democracy 
were not accepted: political loss and the rule of law, which was perceived as arbitrary and 
subject to personal influence rather than legitimate and neutral. This in part is why violence 
prevailed and could do so again. Everyone was dying to win and to let others die on their 
behalf so they could. 
The Continued Salience of Diffused Violence, Weak Institutions, and Zero-Sum 
Politics21 
Since the 2007 elections the salience of the above factors not only has continued but has 
intensified. The demonstration effect of successful gangs has spawned new gangs. They have 
taken on a life of their own in the face of deliberately weakened institutions. Community 
vigilante groups initially organized to protect themselves from militia now have come to 
resemble them and ordinary citizens increasingly are being extorted on multiple fronts.22  
Violence 
In terms of violence, neither gang nor state sponsored violence has been checked. Gangs 
have continued to proliferate, have increased their shakedown operations, and in some areas, 
such as in Nyeri, Murang’a, Meru, and in the slums of Nairobi, have become virtual shadow 
states. Increasingly, the state has lost or abrogated its monopoly of legitimate force and finds 
it difficult to maintain peace or order. In part this is because politicians having used gangs to 
gain or maintain power now are themselves beholden to them or afraid of them. This bodes 
ill, not just for any future elections, but also for the future of Kenya. 
There are many different types of gangs: gangs engaged in extortion; freelance gangs 
that come and go; highly organized ethnic militia such as the Kikuyu Mungiki and to a lesser 
extent the Luo Taliban, among others; gangs connected to politicians and the police; gangs 
that over time have become independent of the forces that initially supported them; and new 
vigilante groups.  
                                                
21 Much of the discussion in this section is drawn from newspaper articles in the Nation and the Standard 
from February 2008 to the present. 
22 “The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project: Review Report for 
October-December 2009,” (Nairobi: South Consulting Group, January 2010), vi–20 (available on 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/ReviewReport2009.pdf, accessed on 28 March 2010). 
10     Susanne D. Mueller 
 
 
A May 2009 report by South Consulting Group23 noted there has been “no systematic 
attempt to disband these groups.” As a result, although these gangs are not trying to take over 
the state or to foment civil war,24 their existence and activities have led to a dangerous 
erosion of the state’s authority and its monopoly of legitimate force. In some areas such as 
Nairobi’s slums and in parts of Central Province, including in the president’s home area of 
Nyeri, gangs effectively have begun to displace government. They shakedown citizens and 
politicians, tax them, and demand protection fees to engage in ordinary activities such as 
building houses and even stopping at intersections. They also ominously mete out justice in 
informal courts, known in one area as “The Hague.” Citizens are frightened. They dare not 
make reports to the police who sometimes demand kickbacks from gang members, and have 
no place to turn. In some areas, individuals in parts of Nyeri have formed retaliatory vigilante 
groups to attack Mungiki groups themselves, leading to a further breakdown of law and 
order, increased extortion, and proliferating crime.  
Elsewhere in the Rift Valley, where most of the deaths from the 2007 elections 
occurred, there are reports of increasing fear, polarization, hostility, rearmament,25 and 
comments such as “never again” by the Kikuyu and “next time we will finish the project” by 
the Kalenjin.26 Increasingly, the choice of weaponry now is an AK 47 rather than bows and 
arrows. 
There has been no political leadership on how to address this proliferating violence 
whether from the political elite or ordinary politicians who either are afraid of the gangs 
themselves or have supported them in the past. Human rights groups and the UN’s Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings have castigated the police for killing innocent youth in 
their attempts to wipe out Mungiki.27 In urban slums such as Kibera, chiefs and other 
                                                
23 “The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project: Status of 
Implementation of Agenda Items 1–4,” Draft Report, May 2009 (Nairobi: South Consulting Group, 2009), 7 
(available on http://www.dialoguekenya.org). 
24 For a discussion about why Kenya had not experienced civil war up to 2005, see Mwangi S. Kimenyi 
and Njuguna S. Ndung’u, “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil 
War?” in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 1 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005). 
25 Gabrielle Lynch, “Durable Solution, Help, or Hindrance? The Failings and Unintended Implications of 
Relief and Recovery Efforts for Kenya’s Post-Election IDPs,” Briefing, Review of African Political Economy 
36, 122 (December 2009), 604-10. 
26 Quotes from private interviews with Kenyans and researchers, 2008–2009. 
27 For discussions and information collected by human rights groups, see http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org/ 
?p=623 (accessed 16 September 2009); For the United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council (11th 
Session, Agenda item 3), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Summary, or Arbitrary 
Executions by Philip Alston no. A/HRC/11/2/Add.6/26 May 2009, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies 
/hrcouncil/11session/reports.htm (accessed 16 September 2009). 
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officials are afraid to go after gang members and other thugs as they fear they might be 
connected to high-level politicians.28 
The combined effect of this is that gangs hold sway in many parts of the country, with 
the state having become impotent, indifferent, or having colluded with gangs to gain power 
to begin with, thereby making them untouchable. Increasingly, there is a powder keg like 
quality to the situation. New gangs have formed in the past year and there is a growing lack 
of trust between ethnic groups and classes.29 More and more individuals report having 
experienced violence in their lives and feeling unsafe,30 something that bodes ill not just for 
Kenya’s political, but for its economic future as well. One result of the 2007 post-election 
violence was that two of Kenya’s key sources of revenue, tourism and horticulture exports, 
declined by approximately 35 and 40 percent, respectively.31 Even now, in many areas, 
gangs effectively have become government in terms of perversely having taken over much of 
its physical space and functions, leaving citizens trapped. 
A recent survey by Synovate reports that in areas affected by the 2007 election, 40 
percent of its respondents predict more violence in 2012.32 In another survey commissioned 
for the Fourth Review Report of The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) 
Monitoring Project, 77 percent of those surveyed blame politicians for inciting violence 
between different groups. This finding dovetails with others done in February 2008 by a 
group from Oxford.33 
Institutions and Zero Sum Politics 
Since the February 2008 agreement to form a “grand coalition,” government has adhered to 
parts of the Annan agenda. It has set up commissions to investigate the election, the post-
election violence, disbanded the former Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and 
established a new Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC), as well as a 
                                                
28 Private discussions. Also see Johan De Smedt, “‘No Raila, No Peace!’ Big Man Politics and Election 
Violence at the Kibera Grassroots,” African Affairs 108, 433 (2009), 581–98. 
29 KNDR, Fourth Review Report (October 2009), 4, 20. 
30 Reports over the past year in Kenya’s dailies, The Nation and The Standard, report an increase in 
crime. This is supported by surveys in which only half of the respondents feel safer than they did six months 
ago, and with 27 percent feeling less safe and another 20 percent feeling about the same. See The Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Project: Status of Implementation of Agenda Items 1–4, Fourth 
Review Report (Nairobi: South Consulting, October 2009), 3, http.www.dialoguekenya.org (last accessed on 15 
October 2009). 
31 Christopher Ksoll, Rocco Macchiavello, and Ameet Morjaria, “The Impact of the Kenyan Post-Election 
Violence on the Kenyan Flower Export Industry,” iiG Briefing paper, 05 August 2009, http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk 
/research/25-contractual-relationships-kenya-flower.htm (accessed on 20 October 2009). 
32 Oliver Mathenge, “Kenyans Wary of Violence in 2012 Elections,” Saturday Nation, October 19, 2001.  
33KNDR Report, 6, and Stefan Dercon (Oxford University) in collaboration with Michael Bratton, 
Mwangi Kimenyi, Roxana Gutierrez-Romero, and Tessa Bold “Ethnicity, Violence, and the 2007 Election” 
(unpublished paper, 08 February 2008). 
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constituency delimitation commission, a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC), and other entities. In April 2010, after contentious discussions and negotiations, 
Parliament also passed a new draft constitution prepared by a special Committee of Experts 
(COE), with its fate to be decided in an upcoming referendum before the end of the year.34 
Behind these formal entities, however, the incentives that guide political life are much 
the same. Politicians are more concerned with positioning themselves and their parties for the 
2012 election, are amassing wealth, refusing to pay taxes, and seem more intent on building 
expensive mansions for the Vice President and the Prime Minister and refurbishing various 
rural state houses than dealing with famine and hunger in the countryside. There also has 
been much political wrangling between President Kenyatta’s largely Kikuyu dominated Party 
of National Unity (PNU) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM), supported by but increasingly fractured between the P.M. and its Rift Valley 
supporters, led by M.P. William Ruto. Nothing has changed in terms of the idea that it is 
necessary and important for particular ethnic coalitions to control the state, at the very least 
to keep other groups from doing so. This underlying trajectory has led to continued standoffs 
between various factions in parliament and between the executive and the prime minister.35 
As this continues, it is not clear that the political elite and their supporters are any 
more prepared to lose elections than they were before, or that there is much interest in 
establishing viable neutral institutions that will uphold the rule of law. Instead, every 
appointment or construction of a new institution is perceived to be part of someone’s political 
agenda, which it often is, and is fought. This occurs because every political act has the 
potential to tilt the balance of power permanently away from one’s own ethnic group. In a 
winner-take-all setting, this is a fearful event. 
This continuation of politics as usual has been no more apparent than in the failed 
attempt to establish a Special Tribunal, recommended by the Waki Commission, to 
investigate and prosecute high-level perpetrators of the 2007 post-election violence.36 
Initially, parliament, which was supposed to pass laws anchoring the tribunal in the 
constitution and insulating it from the local courts, failed to muster the majority to do so. It 
missed its deadlines. For both good and bad reasons, different M.P.s voted for and against the 
bill in February 2009. Some voted against having a Special Tribunal because they felt it 
could not operate on Kenyan soil without being subverted even if there was an international 
presence. Other M.P.s felt it was important for the country for justice to take place locally 
                                                
34  As of April 2010, the TJRC was paralyzed with all of its commissioners demanding that its head 
Bethwell Kiplagat resign because of questions concerning his credibility when he was an official under former 
President Moi.  The new constitution contains greater checks and balances, a new Senate, and some level of 
devolution to the country level, with each of the above changes being contested by parts of the political elite as 
too little or too much change. 
35 See Branch and Cheeseman, “Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Kenya,” for their 
discussion of elite fragmentation. 
36 See the recommendations of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 2007 Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV). 
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and that it was possible. Still other M.P.s wanted the case to go to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in The Hague. Some M.P.s preferred the ICC alternative because they thought 
this was the only way to avoid political interference and seek justice. Others opted for The 
Hague because they thought it would take longer to pursue perpetrators and the ICC would 
go after fewer of them than a Special Tribunal. Under the rules of complementarity in the 
Rome Statute, cases can be taken up by the ICC only if a country itself is unable or unwilling 
to prosecute high level perpetrators for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.  
When it concluded its work, the Waki Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election 
Violence (CIPEV) passed over an envelope with a list of high level organizers and financiers 
of the 2007 violence to the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan. Once Kenya’s 
parliament voted down the bill to establish a Special Tribunal in February 2009, Annan then 
gave the Kenyans a number of additional extensions that were missed. Later, he met a 
government delegation in July 2009 when it came to Geneva and The Hague to discuss the 
situation and to plead for more time. At that point, Annan finally had had enough and passed 
on the envelope to the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo. Thereafter, the 
Kenyan delegation signed minutes with Ocampo agreeing to take steps to establish a Special 
Tribunal or an “alternative judicial mechanism” after which it would report back to Ocampo 
on their progress at the end of September 2009.   
As of August 2009, Kenya’s Cabinet had failed to agree on the proposed law to 
establish a Special Tribunal, splitting among other matters over clauses that would deny the 
President immunity and would keep the Attorney General from interfering in cases so as to 
make the law consistent with the Rome Statute. Instead, Kenya’s Cabinet decided it would 
like to try all cases in its own courts, having promised to reform the judiciary, or expand the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) for this purpose. These proposals were 
roundly criticized by the Kenya public and human rights groups. Afterwards, some M.P.s led 
by Gitobu Imanyara put together a new private member’s bill to establish a Special Tribunal. 
At the time, it was not expected to garner enough votes to pass. However, even before this 
point was reached, the bill failed to obtain a quorum in parliament and thus could not even be 
debated. In their earlier agreed upon minutes with Ocampo, the Kenyan delegation had 
promised to “self refer” to the ICC if it failed to implement its agreement, something that 
never happened. After that, in November 2009, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo requested permission from the ICC’s pre- trial chamber of three judges to 
begin a formal investigation of those most responsible for Kenya’s post-election violence. On 
31 March 2010, he received authorization to do so in a two to one majority opinion.37 
                                                
37  Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Public Document: Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, No. ICC-01/09, International Criminal Court, 31 March 2010 (See http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf; http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2009/07/seeking-truth-justice-reconciliation-
in.html, last accessed on 5 April 2010). Before receiving permission to begin a formal investigation in Kenya, 
the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) was doing a “Situation Analysis” of the case. This was the first time 
the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor had taken up a case on his own volition. Previously, all cases before the court had 
been referred to him either by a country itself (known as self referral) or by the Security Council. 
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Part of the reason for the Waki Commission’s recommendations for a Special 
Tribunal was to pursue justice for the victims of the 2007 post-election violence and to deal 
with the issue of impunity. No high level figures in Kenya have ever been prosecuted for the 
increasingly deadly violence surrounding elections since the early 1990s. Much of it stems 
from the continued refusal to lose elections and the willingness to use violence to win.  The 
failure of the Waki Commission’s recommendations to set up a Special Tribunal and the 
stasis that followed them showed there continues to be no political stomach for high level 
political figures to shed some of their own and to pursue justice. Furthermore, as Kofi Annan 
correctly noted some time ago, “justice delayed is justice denied.” 
The incentives guiding the above decisions to date indicate there is still no desire 
among the political class for strong autonomous independent institutions, applying the rule of 
law, or accepting political loss. Given the continued diffusion of violence, its escalation, and 
the lack of countervailing institutional forces, the next presidential election in 2012 could be 
as, if not more, challenging as the last one. Violence may once again be the arbiter, before, 
during or after the next election if Kenya does not reignite before then. Politicians still are 
dying to win and violence or the threat of violence continues to be the order of the day. 
Following the submission of the Waki Report to the Government of Kenya (GOK) in 
October 2008, potential witnesses who might be called upon either by a Special Tribunal or 
by the ICC increasingly have been hunted down, intimidated, run out of the country, and 
even killed. They include ordinary citizens, possible witnesses, human rights workers 
attempting to protect witnesses, M.P.s, priests, civil servants, and others.38 Various forms of 
harassment have escalated further since the ICC referred the Kenya case to its pre-trial 
chamber. The message being sent to victims of the post election violence, witnesses, and 
their human rights’ defenders who want justice and would like to see the rule of law prevail 
is clear: keep quiet or watch out and suffer. The disincentives for not doing so are very 
costly. This reinforces the existing status quo, further weakens institutions, and increases the 
propensity for violence still further. 
Lessons Learned and Challenges in Managing Electoral Conflict 
The report of Kenya’s Independent Electoral Review Commission (IREC) in September 
2008 recommended a number of technical and institutional changes that needed to be 
implemented to improve the quality of elections in Kenya. Among them were a new electoral 
commission, a new voter register, changes in a number of electoral procedures including 
                                                
38 Numerous reports of witness harassment have appeared in the Kenyan press since the Waki 
Commission finished its work. For recent examples see: The KNDR Monitoring Project, January 2010, 16-17; 
“Ocampo Writes to Mutula Over Witness Threats,” The Standard, January 25 2010; “Kenya: Rift Leaders 
Behind Witnesses Attacks-NSIS,” Nairobi Star, January 15, 2010; “Too Much Talk but Very Little Action,” 
The Standard, January 10, 2010; “Kenya Ocampo: Witnesses Escape Death,” Nairobi Star, January 5, 2010; 
“Imanyara says more threats made on him,” Daily Nation, November 24, 2009; “Threats to Kenya Violence 
witnesses increase,” Daily Nation, March 8, 2010; “Poll Violence: What does this man know? Daily Nation, 
March 20, 2010; Theft in Kenya May Be Tied to ICC Probe,” VOA News, March 7, 2010. 
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tallying, demarcating more equally sized constituencies, and developing sound dispute 
settlement mechanisms, among others. 
To date some of these suggested changes have taken place or are being considered. 
However, Justice Kriegler also noted in his Independent Review Commission Report that in 
assessing the 2007 election it was important distinguish between “anomalies, failures, and 
malpractices traceable to gaps or provisions in the constitution and laws of Kenya from those 
that can be attributed to a bad culture encompassing impunity, disrespect for the rule of law 
and institutional incompetence.” He went on to argue that in Kenya in 2007, “nominally 
democratic elections” took place “within [the] old practices of a one party state.” He noted 
that relevant laws were on the books, but were not adhered to.39 Kriegler also maintained that 
the incentives to apply relevant laws were non-existent, and insisted that “nobody would 
have dreamt of seriously acting against people in high places or even highish places.”40  
This correct observation by Kriegler supports numerous other commission reports. 
This includes the Akiwumi report on the so called “ethnic clashes” of the 1990s, which noted 
that civil servants, lawyers and others who tried to follow the law and report infringements 
were punished where as those who turned a blind eye or undermined the law were 
rewarded.41 
These observations also were reiterated and confirmed throughout the Waki 
Commission’s report into the post election violence in its discussion of the role of civil 
servants, the police, politicians, and the public and in its chapter on impunity.42 The Waki 
report argued that “impunity is especially common in countries that lack traditions of the rule 
of law, suffer from corruption, or that have entrenched systems of patronage, or where the 
judiciary is weak or members of the security forces are protected by special jurisdictional 
immunities.”43 Furthermore, the report also noted “there is of course, a symbiotic 
relationship between the politicians and their supporters which continues to fuel impunity. 
Politicians rely on their supporters to enforce impunity while their supporters, who are the 
handmaidens of the violence, get protection from their political godfathers. This interference 
normally comes in the form of ‘orders from above.’”44 In short, institutions in these 
situations mostly are extensions of personal power; they are not autonomous from each other 
or guided by checks and balances. 
In a recent article, Gyimah-Boadi argued that “[e]lections are now widely accepted as 
central to the project of democratization, and … are invested with unrealistic expectations 
                                                
39 The 2007 Elections in Kenya: Independent Review Commission Report (IREC) (Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 9 September 2008), 23–24. 
40 Ibid., 24. 
41 This point also is discussed in Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis.”  
42 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 2007 Post Election Violence (Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 2008). 
43 Ibid., 445. 
44 Ibid., 459. 
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and powers to resolve all sorts of problems.”45 This is particularly so where one of the main 
problems is that elections are taking place, but in situations that are not democratic. For those 
interested in “promoting good practice in electoral conflict management,” the first challenge 
is to admit, diagnose, and understand the situation on the ground differentiating between 
what can and cannot be accomplished in different circumstances. Burnell notes there is little 
discussion in the literature about why countries that seem to share some of the same 
predisposing characteristics do not all have the same outcomes when in terms of civil strife 
or electoral violence.46 This is an avenue of research worth pursuing. 
Clearly, it is worthwhile for practitioners to develop early warning systems and to 
understand the possible triggers of electoral violence in specific places; to put in place 
mechanisms to protect vulnerable groups; to improve institutions involved in the electoral 
process; to engage in efforts to educate those involved in elections, monitors, and the public; 
and to develop acceptable electoral dispute mechanisms. 
However, in political systems where political power is highly centralized and 
personalized, designed to skirt the law, and to undermine the integrity of institutions, the 
above changes while necessary are not sufficient, may not work, and may not even be used. 
Ultimately, one needs to change the norms and incentives of both politicians and the public. 
As Justice Kriegler noted with respect to Kenya, “The solution is not merely in constitutional 
and legislative changes.” It is tempting to concur with Justice Kriegler that “[t]he culture of 
impunity needs a fix too.”47 However, this is easier said than done as the absence of 
enforcement is symptomatic of, not the cause of underlying political disincentives to change. 
Clearly, not all places are amenable to change at all time nor do they necessarily have the 
incentives to make the difficult choices necessary to embrace the rule of law and the move 
away from violence. 
One difficulty in Kenya is that political power has continued to be very attractive 
even in the post-Moi era. This increases the likelihood that in an increasingly ethnically 
polarized situation already imbued with violence and underwritten by clientism, where the 
state is losing both its legitimacy and its monopoly of legitimate force and diffused violence 
is the order of the day, and where institutions are deliberately kept weak, contenders are 
increasingly likely to resort to violence again to win elections or for other reasons. 
Furthermore, the financial incentives to become an M.P. are huge (Kenyan M.P.s earn some 
of the highest salaries in the world, around $189,000 per annum and mostly untaxed) and 
                                                
45 E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Political Parties, Elections and Patronage: Random Thoughts on Neo-
Patrimonialism and African Democratization,” in Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler, eds., 
Votes, Money, and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 21. 
46 Peter Burnell, “Political Parties in Africa: Different Functional and Dynamic?” in Gyimah-Basedau et 
al., Votes, Money, and Violence, 75. 
47 IREC Report, 29. 
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hard to change.48 Parliament itself decides on its salaries and all attempts to reduce them or 
to tax them have been shot down.  
When it comes to the general public, many of those who participated in the post 
election violence in Kenya were also some of those who suffered and died. However, we 
know little about the ordinary perpetrators and the specific incentives that led them to use 
machetes against citizens from other ethnic groups. This clearly is an area in need of more 
investigation by practitioners and scholars. To manage electoral conflict, it is also necessary 
to understand the motives of those who engage in violence as well as how much of the gang 
labor that kills is impressed into service by politicians and others rather than voluntarily 
performing it. 
In the end, much that results in electoral violence or an inability to contain it stems 
from factors and incentives outside the electoral process itself, something obvious to many 
practitioners but in need of further thought in terms of its practical implications for managing 
conflict. This is certainly the case in Kenya as noted in the earlier parts of this paper. The 
failure to appreciate the gravity of these factors, the incentives exogenous to elections and the 
technical factors related to them, as well as the implications of the mounting severity and 
diffusion of past violence are some of the reasons policy makers, practitioners, and most 
scholars did not anticipate the 2007 post election violence in Kenya. 
Much of the literature on managing elections in conflict prone situations is devoted to 
questions of whether new electoral institutions, different administrative arrangements 
(centralization versus decentralization or federalism) or different types of electoral systems 
(various genres of proportional representation) can be used to change incentive systems so as 
to diffuse the potential for violence, particularly in developing countries.49 Apart from the 
lack of consensus among analysts, it is worth reiterating here that the history of institutional 
change in Kenya has been the hollowing out of formal changes to preserve the status quo and 
the hegemony of the political elite.50 This would suggest examining Keefer’s finding that 
different types of formal political and electoral systems are not significant predictors of 
political conflict51 before assuming that implementing similar changes in Kenya would work. 
Also, as Andrew Reynolds has noted “like medications, institutional remedies themselves are 
seldom if ever sufficient” and “constitutional therapists often get it wrong.”52 Even scholars 
like Roger Southall who believe that proportional representation deserves more consideration 
                                                
48 A recent commission suggested increasing M.P.s salaries and perks to around $210,000 a year. See 
“New Pay Hike for Kenyan M.P.s,” Daily Nation, January 10, 2010. 
49 Among others, see articles in The Journal of Democracy 13, 2 (April 2002). Also see Roger Southall, 
“Electoral Systems and Democratization in Africa,” in John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Morris Szeftel, eds., 
Voting for Democracy: Watershed Elections in Contemporary Anglophone Africa (Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 
1999), 19–36. 
50 See Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis.”  
51 Philip Keefer, “Insurgencies and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies,” World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1(January 2008), 25–26. 
52 Andrew Reynolds, “Constitutional Medicine,” Journal of Democracy 16, 1 (January 2005), 64. 
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in Kenya admit there “is a marked circularity about Kenyan politics” that has “negated 
reform and left politicians unaccountable.”53 
Furthermore, the answers to two great unknowns continue to haunt policy makers and 
others: first, under what conditions do political competitors abjure violence and how can 
outsiders accelerate this process, if at all? Even if it is an inherent good, it is not clear how 
much promoting the usual types of electoral assistance provided by donors actually helps, in 
situations such as those in Kenya, even though it is far better than doing nothing, nor is it 
obvious what would help. What one does know is that countries that have experienced 
conflict are at a higher risk of more conflict.54 
Conclusions 
The above discussion raises a number of issues and questions that pertain to Kenya, but go 
beyond it. They deserve to be explored, even if not fully in this paper. 
The mask of elections amidst the deliberate weakening of institutions to personalize 
and maintain power and the simultaneous diffusion of violence to win power is dangerous. In 
contrast to the past, in Kenya the integrity of the state itself still may be threatened 
increasingly by simultaneous but different violent pressures from militia and other groups 
controlled by competing ethnic factions in a nominal coalition government as the fabric of 
nationhood disintegrates. The question arises not only if it is possible to hold democratic 
elections in this environment, but if diffused violence can be contained when a state not only 
has lost its monopoly of legitimate force but also its legitimacy. The increasing groundswell 
of disgust from below could turn ugly, including the possibility of inciting a reversion to 
authoritarianism or worse. Furthermore, the use of coalitions may be the beginning of a 
retreat away from a multi-party situation and back to a one party state in another form. 
The broader question of the causes and consequences of the above syndrome is of 
interest to both policy makers and scholars concerned with democratic transitions. Moi’s aim 
in using extra state militia to eliminate his electoral opposition in the 1990s had the 
unintended side effect of chipping away at the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. This was 
not its goal. Almost twenty years later, violence is diffused and out of the state’s control. 
Pandora’s Box is open. A collective action question arises here: under what circumstances do 
political elites, who themselves theoretically need peace and order to further many of their 
own interests, not have the incentives, power, or ability to take back the state’s monopoly, 
instead of participating in destroying it, and why? 
The further question of why the increasingly prominent private sector has not acted as 
a bulwark against institutional decay and rising violence rather than being a part of it, a point 
raised in the introduction, is another important question. What factors prevent it from 
assuming its historic role, why is it still so wrapped up with the state rather than autonomous 
from it, and what are the implications of this situation for the transition to democracy, if any? 
                                                
53 Roger Southall, “Alternatives for Electoral Reform in Kenya: Lessons from Southern Africa,” Journal 
of Contemporary African Studies 27, 3 (2009), 456–57. 
54 Keefer, “Insurgencies and Credible Commitment,” 27. 
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The discussion of the causes and legacies of Kenya’s 2007 post election violence and 
the more general observations above suggest that those engaged in electoral conflict 
management face genuine difficulties about how to proceed. One major problem is that well-
known good electoral management practices, which certainly should not be abandoned, are 
often undermined deliberately by forces exogenous to elections themselves and may not be 
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